In 1928, upon celebrating the tenth anniversary of the union between Bessarabia and Romania, historian Alexandru V. Boldur (1886-1982; Magazin istoric, 3/1991) published the study titled Unirea. Analiza psihologică a evenimentelor (“The Union. A Psychological Analysis of the Events”). Actually, as the author himself confessed, this was but a chapter of a much more extensive work titled Chestiunea Basarabiei şi regimul comunist rusesc (“The Bessarabian Issue and the Russian Communist Regime”). As the historian was writing: “Its fundamental idea is as follows: The new social and political regime surfaces in Russia, temporarily coated in communism. Russian communism in itself is an unprecedented historical example of ferocity and cynicism. Hence, communists have no right whatsoever to blame the political regime in general and its implementation in Bessarabia in particular”.
We have selected several excerpts from the aforementioned work, "Unirea. Analiza psihologică a evenimentelor", which has never been reprinted, meant to introduce today’s readers to the spiritual and psychological atmosphere of those who concocted and put into practice the great endeavor of 1918.
Prior to perusing the selected pages, a few words about the author. By maternal filiation, he was a descendent of an ancient boyar family, while his father’s ancestors belonged to the Bessarabian petty bourgeoisie. He attended high-school in Chişinău and then graduated from Law School and archeology studies in Sankt Petersburg. After teaching at the Sankt Petersburg University (1916-1918) and the Higher Legal Institute in Sevastopol (1918-1921), he acted as legal adviser in Moscow (1922-1924).
October 1924 sees his clandestine crossing of the Dniester River, when Alexandru V. Boldur decided to move to Romania on a permanent basis. Pan Halippa, whom he had met ever since the summer of 1917, when Al. V. Boldur was in Chişinău attending the preparatory events ahead of the union, advised him to contact Constantin Stere. “It is quite odd” – Al. V. Boldur writes – “that he did not even pay closer attention to my educational background, to the scope of my studies. He merely said that, in his opinion, I would stand no chance of ever teaching in Romania, because the country’s inhabitants took an almost spiteful stance in relation to Bessarabians, and that it would be better for me to settle anywhere but in Romania!” (Memorii. Viaţa mea. Lumini şi umbre – “Memoirs. My Life. Lights and Shadows”, 2006).
Then he left for France, where he continued his historical research. It was there that he published the study La Bessarabie et les relations russo-roumaines. La question bessarabienne et le droit international (“Bessarabia and Russian-Romanian Relations. The Bessarabian Issue and International Law”), Paris, 1927. Nae Ionescu referred to the paper as “the first theoretical justification of our rights over Bessarabia, which we can present in front of Europe”. The research paper was highly acclaimed by Nicolae Iorga as well, who helped the author build a well-deserved university career in Romania.
Starting 1927, he taught at the Theology Institute in Iaşi (1927-1938) and then at the Faculty of Letters in the same city (1938-1947), a position from which he was forced to retire ahead of schedule. As of 1943, he also acted as director of the “A.D. Xenopol” History Institute in Iaşi, from where he resigned in 1948. After the communists seized power, Alexandru V. Boldur managed to overcome all obstacles and continued his historical research, as well as his plea for the Romanian cause in Bessarabia, now baptized the Moldavian Socialist Soviet Republic. Either by himself or along with other prominent figures from interwar Bessarabia, he forwarded several memoranda to Nicolae Ceauşescu, as well as his books on Bessarabia. As a result, on 3 February 1967, he was summoned at the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party, where he met Nicolae Guină, former ambassador to Moscow. Al. V. Boldur reminisces that the former ambassador “made me aware that my works sent to comrade Ceauşescu had been submitted to the Library of Party History Institute. His point of view was that we should not get involved in the Soviet Union’s internal affairs (?). The pending issue of both Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina would be solved one way or another (?), while the struggle to defend our nationality would last for two or three generations.” Let us, therefore, muse upon Al. V. Boldur’s writings dating back eight decades ago.

Ioan LĂCUSTĂ

The union between Bessarabia and Romania was carried out under highly complex circumstances, including psychological ones. On the one hand, there was the Russian revolution and on the other hand the victory of the Central Powers. Furthermore, one should not overlook the national movement in Bessarabia and the natural propensity of the Romanian Kingdom for reuniting with Bessarabia. This was the background against which personal relations and the struggle of political parties emerged, which eventually crayoned in clear-cut shapes the act of the Grand Union. The historical sense of nationality gained the upper hand. The victor was that particular “sense” that King Ferdinand was mentioning in his Address to the Chamber of Deputies on 4 June 1918: “Let us thank Heaven that, precisely during those harsh times, the superior sense of our kinfolk made it so that the charming Moldavian land torn apart from its ancestral boundaries returned to the Motherland, while the Bessarabian people rushed to its bosom to give further impetus to our efforts and confidence in the future.”
You are on your own

The so-called “democratic Bessarabian republic” was proclaimed on 2 December 1917. The existence of a republic automatically implied power and controlling and protecting the population, which called for such means as an army and public finance. The Directorate (i.e. the government), which emanated from both centers under Erhan’s presidency, set to work in a tireless drive.
The difficulties stemmed from the fact that, at the time, this strip of land [Bessarabia] was the rearguard of the [Romanian] army. While organizing power is generally not an easy endeavor in itself, it becomes more of a bumpy ride at the rearguard of the army. Not to mention that the flanks were occupied by the only sturdy forces at the time, namely the Romanian army and the Bolsheviks with their demagogy, powerful thanks to the headway made in central Russia. The Romanian army, for which Bessarabia acted as the rearguard, was highly interested in warranting stable order in the province. To it, this was a “military necessity” in the utmost sense of the phrase. Any public disturbance could not be tolerated, because this would have jeopardized its own existence. Meanwhile, the action triggered a counteraction: the Directorate’s attempts at normalizing everyday life and instituting order and peacefulness met a fierce resistance on the part of the Bolsheviks. Little by little, they managed to expand their spheres of influence and concentrated their armies on Chişinău. The latter half of December 1917 saw some desperate efforts of the Directorate to preserve its dominant position. As of 28 December, the Bolsheviks embarked upon the systematic enterprise of seizing power. The Directorate dispatched numerous telegrams both to general Shcerbacev [commander of the Russian troops in Moldova] and to the Romanian authorities in Iaşi, but to no avail. “We also need soldiers on the front; as long as you can maintain order, you are on your own”. This was basically the articulate message indicating that neither general Shcerbacev, nor the Romanian General Staff would rush to help out the Directorate.
Eventually, a mob of Transylvanian prisoners arrive in Chişinău from Kyiv no earlier than 6 January [1918]. So this could hardly be considered as direct support coming from the other side of the Prut River. But the incoming mob was disarmed by the Bolsheviks. Now mastering the situation, they dare launch an open challenge to the government, requiring that all directors be held accountable for their previous actions. This marks the first and most dramatic moment of the Bessarabian revolution, with a face-to-face meeting between representatives of the urban proletariat – the Bolsheviks – and those of the Bessarabian peasantry, representing the “center”. Only now (probably influenced by the accounts of the Moldavian Block delegates in Iaşi) did the Romanian General Staff finally dispatched its troops to the young republic in order to contribute to restoring order.
Why independence first?

On 13 January, the Romanian troops under the command of General Broşteanu approached Chişinău and took control over the city. General Broşteanu was welcomed at Străşeni by delegates of the Parliamentary Assembly (Sfatul Ţării), while the general himself visited the Assembly on 15 January 1918. He attended that day’s meeting and, in a soldier-like manner, he addressed a few simple, tactful words, which put in a nutshell a lesson of political wisdom. He said: “Many citizens of the republic are suspicious and overwhelmed with fear regarding their liberties. I must avow that Romania is in a difficult position and it has no conflict or war of conquest in mind. You have decided to establish your own republic, yet you lack your own forces. With every hour gone by, your republic sees more plundering and killing and there’s nothing you can do about it”. He emphasized the overarching goal of his arrival: supporting the army and securing public order, after which he added: “No government may solve the issues confronting it in the absence of organized force. Only such a force can safeguard the peaceful existence of a state. Go on organizing your life as you see fit and no one will interfere. We shall not prevent you from doing so”.
And indeed, he kept his promise. Except for the first few days, when some non-Bolsheviks were subjected to the same treatment as Bolsheviks – by accident, due to the unfamiliarity of the army staff with on-site conditions or to the recklessness of victims themselves – the army fulfilled its duty of restoring order, with no interferences whatsoever in the political life.
The Romanians army laid the groundwork for free, peaceful debates and allowed the government to better organize itself. Chasing the Bolsheviks away actually meant annihilating the very source of turmoil, unrest and permanent threat to public order. As a result, the Parliamentary Assembly overcame its fears that Bessarabia would be devastated and engulfed in anarchy, due to the threat on the left side. But the right-side threat lingered on, namely the fear of losing the revolutionary gains, the fear that the Romanian army would bring about a counterrevolutionary spirit, kindling the peasants’ hopes for freedom and land ownership. These sentiments were reflected in the independence proclaimed on 24 January 1918. It was at that particular point in time when those opposing the Union were proven wrong. In fact, their allusions can easily be contradicted. Assuming that the Romanian army “occupied”, “conquered” and “annexed” Bessarabia, how come the annexed republic first proclaimed its independence instead of uniting with Romania in the first place? Similarly, assuming that General Broşteanu “took over” things, how come the general who “conquered” Bessarabia did not “dismiss” right away the “intrepid” Parliamentary Assembly that dared proclaim its independence? The answer is obvious: there was no such thing as an annexation.
With a weakly-developed national sentiment, the following idea burgeoned in the Bessarabians’ mind: why organize our own army when the troops securing the current order – namely the army from across the Prut River – are actually ours? That particular moment, when an invisible obstacle between the army and the political world was overcome, marked the psychological beginnings of the Union itself.

People can be wrong,
but not history

To this added the increasingly prominent role played by the propaganda of Romanian intellectuals, especially those in Transylvania. Such propaganda was aimed at persuading Bessarabians they had nothing to fear about losing their freedom and agrarian reform, whilst also convincing them that other parts of the Romanian nation were equally anxious to see the Union materialize. This line of action proved highly successful. Bessarabia saw itself immersed deeper and deeper into the national spirit. The only pending issue was now the actual timing of putting the desire into practice.
Romania was facing bleak prospects when, under pressure from enemy troops and left to fight all by itself in the aftermath of the Russian revolution, it had no other choice but to negotiate a ceasefire with the Germans, followed by peace talks. The Central Powers proposed to General Averescu, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, that Romania seize Bessarabia and share it with the Austrians in exchange for Dobrudja. The general turned down the proposal. The peace treaty was signed in Buftea on 5 March (by the new calendar). In the meantime, the Parliamentary Assembly in Bessarabia receives petitions from all over the republic, along with appeals for Union addressed to the Romanian administration in Iaşi.
The government headed by Averescu is replaced by the Marghiloman cabinet on 18 March. The country loses its province of Dobrudja and plunges into despair. Then the Romanian government has a natural and quite reasonable idea: why delay the solving of an issue that is already ripe, namely the Union with Bessarabia. After all, the Bessarabian population had conveyed sufficient signs of sympathy in relation to Romania. It now all boiled down to vanquishing once and for all the fear of losing the revolutionary gains. On the other hand, the vanquished country needed the victor’s approval for any such endeavor. The Germans consented. In so doing, they should not be credited with any merit whatsoever. They could not have taken over Bessarabia either for themselves or for the Austrians because everything would have been against such seizure, in terms of geography, ethnography, and history.
The only pending matter was the second part of the program – obtaining the formal approval of the population itself, by persuading the few who were still hesitant. The person chosen for such an exploit was Stere.
And indeed, who could have accomplished this task better than him? A former militant in the Bessarabian revolution, educated within the same atmosphere of the Russian peasantry current as most intellectuals of the republic, hurled by the revolutionary waves in leading positions of this province. Who else could have found the way to each Moldavian’s heart? The assumption proved right. About that time (on 23 March), the representatives of Bessarabia, Inculeţ and Ciugureanu, were passing through Iaşi, coming from Bucharest, where negotiations with the Germans had taken place. Both of them gave their assent to the Union, which contributed even more to the success of this exploit. All three, Stere, Inculeţ and Ciugureanu (it was the personal merit of these individuals), left for Chişinău, to help carry out the Union. The days of 24, 25 and 26 March (by the old calendar) were reserved for talks and debates. Various sections of the Parliamentary Assembly give the nod.
Afterwards, it was obvious that the Assembly in its entirety would vote in favor of the Union. The meeting of the Parliamentary Assembly held on an ad-hoc basis on 27 March was also attended by Marghiloman, Chairman of the Council of Ministers. The Union was solemnly agreed upon after Marghiloman’s address (who left the auditorium so as not to violate the freedom of the vote) and Stere’s speech. After the voting procedure, upon returning to the hall and being informed of the outcome, Marghiloman accepted the vote of the Parliamentary Assembly on behalf of the Romanian people and of the Romanian King. The audience exclaimed “Long live inseparable Romania!”.
This was the complete mechanics of the driving forces that played a role in the national and social movement in Bessarabia. All elements of this movement – left and right centers, the Romanian army, the Romanian propaganda, the extra-parliamentary expressions of sympathy towards Romania, the world war-related events, the personal merits of various citizens – were equally necessary in order to produce this outcome. All these taken together make up a complex unity, the entirety of mutually-conditioned actions. When adequately mulling over the Union ten years after the event itself – which the opponents still consider unexplainable, by twisting and turning the actual events and referring exclusively to the merit of Romanian bayonets – it is safe to assume that it was an act of historical wisdom.
We, people, can be wrong. But old history knows its way. It leads the Romanian nationality towards rebirth, towards organizing a new state, while also creating a new culture and constructing new values.