Almost 20 years after Eastern Europe embarked on the post-communist transition, Moldova has a chance to launch that process in earnest after the repeat parliamentary elections held on July 29. The repeat elections' outcome is almost as indecisive as that of the April 5 elections. The Communist Party (in power since 2001) won for the fourth consecutive time, but has now fallen short of the absolute majority necessary for governing. There are four opposition parties in the new parliament, and they are divided by outlook and interests.

Final election returns (Moldpres, Basapres, August 1) show the Communist Party with 48 seats in the 101-seat parliament, the Liberal-Democrat Party with 18, Liberal Party with 15 Democratic Party with 13, and Our Moldova with 7 seats. The communist and liberal labels are largely nominal rather than ideological. Several leaders of these parties intend to seek election as head of state by parliament to replace President Vladimir Voronin, whose second and final term expired in April but who serves as acting president under controversial legal arrangements.

This is a hung parliament, requiring complex and even improbable bargains for electing a state president, installing a government, and proceeding with the enactment of overdue reforms. The political atmosphere in Chisinau remains suffused with mutual intolerance and inflammatory rhetoric on all sides, except the revamped Democratic Party, headed by the preceding parliament's chairman Marian Lupu. The parliament will have to hold its meetings in some improvised premises. Its building and that of the state presidency were devastated on April 7 by mobs including the opposition's sympathizers, protesting against the Communist Party's April 5 election victory (which proved, however, almost as indecisive as the July 29 repeat election's outcome).

Moldova's transition process is mired today in an early post-Soviet stage. The Communist Party retains deep roots in society (through Soviet nostalgia, the power of patronage, and still-widespread societal deference to authority); the posts of party leader and head of state are merged into one; a de facto pyramid of power (albeit with significant gaps) holds the state together, instead of genuine state institutions; non-transparent business entities linked to the ruling group dominate the internal market; justice and law enforcement are subject to political control from the top; deficient, antiquated administrative capacity is setting the country apart from Europe; electoral processes and party politics are largely managed as projects of "political technology;" the Russian and "Russian-speaking" minorities look toward Moscow; public television is loyal to the authorities, politically effective despite its deadwood quality; and the country itself remains embedded in Russia's information and mass-media space.

In one major advance from the early post-Soviet stage, the Communist Party leadership and the government loyal to it (which is not party-affiliated) have put Moldova, since 2004, on the path toward integration with the European Union, and remain committed to that course after the 2009 elections. Nevertheless, given the exigencies of two consecutive electoral campaigns this year, the communists have tactically moved toward a "two-vector" policy of balance between a European and a Russian orientation. Some other parliamentary parties are also making tactical overtures to Moscow in the election's aftermath. The E.U.'s wait-and-see attitude during these many months has, unnecessarily, made the Russian factor more relevant to Moldova's internal politics than has been the case in many years.

The country is now literally disabled from pursuing the E.U. integration course with a vacant state presidency, lame-duck caretaker government, and a deeply fragmented parliament that may again fail to elect a president and install a government. The institutional vacuum has set in since March and may continue for some time, leading to yet another round of parliamentary and presidential elections next year, while the country sinks deeper into a crisis of governance amid an economic crisis.

E.U. authorities in Brussels are conscious of that risk. The E.U.'s high representative for foreign and security policy, Javier Solana, has publicly urged all parties in the new parliament to install a government and elect the head of state as expeditiously as possible, in the country's interest and in order to start negotiations with the E.U. toward a possible association agreement. A joint statement by Solana, the E.U. External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner, and the E.U.'s Swedish Presidency emphasizes the same message (E.U. press releases, July 30, 31).

Vladimir Socor


August 3, 2009—Volume 6, Issue 148

MOLDOVA'S COMMUNIST PARTY OPEN TO ALLIANCES AFTER INSUFFICIENT ELECTORAL VICTORY

by Vladimir Socor

With the Communist Party still the strongest by far in society and holding almost half the seats in the new parliament, Moldova's post-communist transition becomes peculiarly complicated. The crucial question is whether the transition can be managed together with the Communist Party in a broad-based coalition; or, alternatively, if it must be pursued through a confrontation against that party, exacerbating the country's already deep polarization and prolonging a dangerous vacuum of governance.

Paradoxically in Moldova, the Communist Party's cooperation to advance the transition process may be both necessary and feasible. The issue mainly depends on whether the Communist Party agrees to join other parties in a pact on reforms, as a prerequisite to forming a parliamentary majority for governance. In order to enter such an alliance as a credible partner, the Communist Party would also have to undertake its own, overdue internal reform.

The party has proven its resilience, but has clearly entered a period of decline. It garnered approximately 45 percent of the total votes cast in the July 29 elections, some 4 percent down from the party's April performance. It lost 13 parliamentary seats, from 60 down to 48 in percentage terms, through the redistribution of votes under the proportional system (Moldpres, Basapres, August 1).

While still the strongest, the Communist Party is no longer capable of hegemonic ambitions; and is bound to decline gradually through generational and societal changes (including the ever-higher share of the Moldovan expatriate vote from Europe). A party of this size remains a major factor of stability under any circumstances; in the highly fractious, destabilization-prone Moldova, this party can form a basis of stability for the duration of another electoral cycle. During this term and beyond it, the Communist Party's patronage powers and societal deference to its leaders will steadily and inevitably decline.

On the other hand, the Communist Party can act as an insurmountable blocking minority in the newly elected parliament. The party must decide whether to play spoiler, or to join with other parties in a broad-based political construction. As a spoiler, it can force the holding of new parliamentary and presidential elections--the third ones within 12 months--freezing the country's external financing for the duration, as well as derailing the negotiation of an association agreement with the European Union. On the other hand, by opting for a coalition-based policy of reforms, the Communist Party could facilitate a real resumption of post-Soviet transformations in Moldova with Western support.

Communist Party leader Vladimir Voronin--serving as temporary acting head of state since April, for an as yet undetermined period--and his team are now considering the following possible options:

1. Narrow alliance of the Communist and Liberal-Democrat parties. With 18 parliamentary seats, the Liberal-Democrat Party has pulled ahead of the [unhyphenated] Liberal Party in their competition for primacy in opposition ranks. Essentially a project of business tycoons, the Liberal-Democrat Party includes, however, a component drawn from civil society and also a Romanian national-irredentist component. These components may split off in the event that party leader Vlad Filat enters into an alliance with the Communist Party. Moreover, Liberal-Democrats fear that a separate deal with the communists could trigger an exodus of Liberal-Democrats to the militant anti-communist and Romanian-irredentist Liberal Party, which holds 15 seats in the new parliament. Meanwhile, Liberal-Democrat leader Vlad Filat harbors presidential ambitions and is currently rejecting any cooperation with the Communist Party.

2. Broad alliance of the Communist, Democratic, and Liberal-Democrat parties; or substituting Our Moldova (seven seats) for the Liberal-Democrat Party in the triangle. The Democratic Party's 13 seats, added to the Communist and Liberal-Democrat seats, would combine to form a constitutional majority (making it possible to rectify the constitution's loopholes and ambiguities) and a stable basis for a legislative cycle. The Communist Party's leadership considers this option most seriously, subject to bargaining over the distribution of state offices. Democratic Party leader Marian Lupu is a potential candidate for the state presidency. This Democratic Party's new leadership is the most Westernized among all Moldovan parties. Reborn and rebranded, the party aims to consolidate itself on the left-of-center side of the spectrum. The Democratic Party would only cooperate with the communists on the basis of a clear agenda for reforms; and it would only consider joining an alliance of three parties, ruling out a bilateral alliance with the communists (Basapres, July 30, August 1).

3. Temporary abdication of the Communist Party from power. The party leadership warns that it may go into opposition, if other parties coalesce with "radical forces" (presumably the Liberal Party); but would in that case behave as a "responsible opposition" (i.e., not block the election of a president and formation of a government) (Moldpres, July 30, August 1). In that event, a government could theoretically be formed by an alliance of four parties: the Liberal, Liberal-Democrat, Democratic, and Our Moldova, adding up to 53 seats in the parliament. However, these parties' differences of outlook and interests would make it very unlikely and perhaps impossible to create and maintain such an alliance. The Liberal Party's close ties with Bucharest and its confrontational style would pose additional problems. At present, the Liberal Party does not aim to govern, but rather to gather strength as the main opposition (and sole "right-wing") force, as some initial advice from Bucharest suggests. Meanwhile, the communist leadership feels tempted to go into opposition before the economic crisis hits Moldova with full force as expected by this autumn. In that case, the combination of economic crisis and powerful communist opposition could soon bring down a non-communist government, even before the post-communist transition could start in earnest.

Eurasia Daily Monitor. The Jamestown Foundation

August 3, 2009—Volume 6, Issue 148

July 31, 2009—Volume 6, Issue 147

MOLDOVA'S ELECTIONS: LIMITED COMMUNIST VICTORY DEEPENS DEADLOCK

by Vladimir Socor

Moldova's nominal Communist Party has won the parliamentary elections yet again on July 29, far ahead of the other parties. These elections were a repeat of the elections held on April 5, which the nominally Liberal opposition had refused to recognize as valid, in contrast to Western observers. Following the repeat elections the communists will only hold a plurality, not an absolute majority of seats in the new parliament, necessitating ad hoc alliances and a governing coalition.

The Communist Party garnered some 45 percent of the total votes cast, translating (under the proportional system) into 48 seats in the 101-seat parliament. Four other parties will share the other 53 seats. The electoral campaign was vitriolic, focused overwhelmingly on the responsibility for the April 7 destruction of the main state buildings in Chisinau and the ensuing police crackdown.

Alliances are a long shot in the current atmosphere of deep political fragmentation and degeneration of political debate into hate speech by most party leaders and their media, with the notable exception of the Democratic Party. Coalition arrangements will be required, however, for the new parliament to constitute itself and start operating, install a government, and elect a head of state. Meanwhile, Moldova's institutional vacuum is deepening on all these counts.

The Communist Party's score reflects both the static fact of its preeminence in Moldovan society and the dynamic of its slow but irreversible erosion. Thanks to the "communist" brand's attractiveness, the party has placed first in five consecutive parliamentary elections (1998, 2001, 2005, April 2009, and the July 2009 repeat elections), garnering nearly one half of the total votes cast and, thus, an absolute majority of parliamentary seats in the 2001-2005-2009 electoral cycles.

The nominally liberal opposition has gained very little by forcing these repeat elections after the April 2009 regular quadrennial elections. The parliamentary deadlock has, if anything, deepened; political fragmentation among the non- and anti-communist parties has not become any less complicated; and the Communist Party has become more susceptible to tactical deal-making. In the April elections the communists had obtained 49.5 percent of the popular vote and 60 parliamentary seats. Following the repeat elections, however, it is the up-and-coming Democratic Party, not the liberal opposition that has emerged as main potential beneficiary of the Communist Party's erosion.

Of the five parliamentary parties, all but the Democratic Party are linked in various ways with political projects of the past. The Communist Party appeals to Soviet nostalgia and mentalities and it operates to a large extent in Russia's cultural and informational orbit. The Liberal Party is at its core a Romanian national irredentist party, oriented toward Bucharest and, in that sense, an heir to the inter-war period in "Bessarabia." The Liberal-Democrat Party (which also includes a Romanian national-nostalgic strand) is largely a project of business tycoons who rose during the 1990s but did not manage at that time to introduce a political oligarchic model in Moldova. The third nominally liberal party, Our Moldova, is led by veteran officials from the final Soviet and initial post-Soviet years (ex-communists who dropped that brand), now on the threshold of retirement and hoping for a last go at government posts.

The newly launched Democratic Party with its 13 seats is well placed to hold the balance of power between the communists and the three nominal liberal parties in the new parliament. The party's new leadership group is culturally distinct from the other parliamentary parties. It is for the most part a Westernized group, well traveled and fluent in English and French, and connected with Western political, diplomatic and professional circles. On the vexed issue of Moldovan versus Romanian national identity, Democratic Party leaders profess a Moldovan civic and ethnic identity, free from the otherwise widespread inferiority complexes, and harmonizable with Romanian cultural identity.

Marian Lupu, the chairman of the outgoing parliament (2005-2009), took over a moribund Democratic Party in early and mid-June, with barely five or six weeks to go until election day. Resigning from the Communist Party, Lupu recreated and rebranded the Democratic Party as a possible balance-holder between the two large antagonistic camps and vehicle for Lupu's own presidential ambitions. The party rose above the fray of mutual vilification and demonization that characterized this campaign. For a brand new entrant, the Democratic Party scored better than could have been expected, despite some clumsy tactical errors and hastily thrown together campaign staff. In its electoral appeal and discourse, this is the first Moldovan party fully emancipated from projects of the past and their still-vivid sequels in Moldova (Soviet/Russian, Romanian, shadow business structures). In this sense it can be said that the Democratic Party is Moldova's future-oriented party.