A PECULIAR COMMUNIST PARTY RUNS FOR REELECTION IN MOLDOVA
(Moldova's Political Landscape on the Eve of General Elections: Part I of three)

by Vladimir Socor

Moldova will hold parliamentary elections on April 5, and its new parliament will elect the new president and confirm a new government. Incumbent President Vladimir Voronin's second, final term of office expires in April. The transition process ahead will severely test the country's weak political system. Moldovan elections seem baffling and fraught with complexities like the country itself, in ways often eluding outside observers.

Ranked as Europe's poorest country by its GDP and the number one exporter of cheap labor, Moldova is the only CIS member country to have held consistently free and fair elections (with the usual insignificant irregularities) from 1990 to date. Indeed all the parliamentary majority parties and all presidents failed to win re-election until the Party of Communists managed to do so in 2005, a feat it hopes to repeat on April 5, albeit from a weaker position and necessitating allies in the new parliament.

Most party labels are meaningless or downright misleading in Moldova. The incumbent majority party is communist in name only. Party leaders use that name as an electoral brand, attractive to a critical mass of voters. Moldova is the only post-Soviet country to have returned a communist party to power—and not once, but repeatedly. Communist parties were subjected to restrictions everywhere in post-Soviet elections; but the Moldovan Communists competed unrestricted in this country's free elections. The party gained a plurality of parliamentary seats in 1998 and an absolute majority of the seats in 2001 and again in 2005. It won the 2001 elections on a platform of nostalgia for the Soviet period and the 2005 elections on a pro-Europe platform, having run afoul of Moscow by 2003-2004.

For another seeming paradox in Moldova, the Christian-Democrats with their long record of militant anti-communism entered into a parliamentary partnership with the Communist Party, once Voronin's team had adopted a European orientation and stood up to Russia. Although the Communist Party sometimes vacillated on both counts, the Christian-Democrats understood the importance of not isolating the state leadership and not forcing it to depend on Moscow-oriented local allies. In this situation the Christian-Democrats understand that Moldovan anti-Communists were fighting yesterday's battles.

Moldova is the only European country where clinging to the Communist label is (until now, at least) politically expedient for the authorities. Indeed, the party's internal polls have shown that it would lose more voters than it would gain if it were to change the party's name. The lost votes would then accrue mostly to Russia-oriented and leftist groups. In their frustration some of these groups accuse Voronin's team of manipulating the "Russian-speaking" and Communist voters, by paying lip service to them while actually pulling the country away from Russia into the EU. Within inter-parliamentary organizations, the Moldovan Communists affiliate with surviving remnants of the Euro-Communist parties of the 1980s and other marginal Euro-leftists.

Essentially a parliamentary republic under the constitution, Moldova nevertheless functions in practice as a presidential republic, with decision-making authority concentrated in the presidential office. President Vladimir Voronin controls de facto the parliament and government in his dual capacity as head of state and leader of the majority party. Within the Communist party and among much of the Moldovan populace, Voronin enjoys what used to be described in another time and place as a "dictature du respect."

Despite this party's majority status, Moldova cannot be termed a "communist-ruled" or "communist-governed" state. The government's 19 members include only two Communists, the others being politically unaffiliated. In this election, however, half the government's members are running for parliament on the Communist Party's slate. Voronin embraced the agenda of European integration in 2004 ahead of his party and must often nudge an uncomprehending or reluctant parliamentary majority to adopt legislation envisaged by the Moldova-European Union Action Plan. Many Communist parliamentarians grumble but ultimately they march to the EU's tune. This modus operandi has proven relatively effective thanks to Voronin's dual role as head of state and of the majority party. This turned out to be a basis for stability and incremental changes in a destitute provincial society.

The Communists' administrative resources are weaker this time, following substantial setbacks in the 2007 local elections. Opposition parties can and do use administrative resources in the many administrative units now under their control. The Communists Party retains control over 11 district councils; opposition parties in various combinations now control 14 district councils as well as (however narrowly) the city of Chisinau; the balance of power is uncertain in yet another eight districts (BBC Monitoring Research, March 9).

Voronin, Parliament chairman Marian Lupu, and Prime Minister Zinaida Grecianai hold the first three places on the Communist Party's electoral slate. Top presidential adviser Marc Tcaciuc (number seven on that slate) has been seconded to coordinate the party's electoral campaign. Tcaciuc had led an effort to rejuvenate the party in the run-up to the campaign. The effort succeeded in elevating a young group to the party leadership around Voronin. But the rejuvenation stopped half-way on the electoral slate, where Soviet-bred veterans still counterbalance the young element.

The party's campaign motto is more telling in the Russian-language version than in the Romanian one about the party's evolution: "Postroim Vmeste Yevropeiskuyu Moldovu. Kommunisticheskaya Partiya R.M" ("Let us build together a European Moldova. The Communist Party of R.M."). Program goals include negotiating and signing an association agreement with the European Union, freer access of Moldovan citizens and goods to the EU, and resolving the Transnistria conflict through a negotiated autonomy status on the basis of Moldova's territorial integrity, its continuing neutrality, and its demilitarization.

The Communist Party promises to cooperate in the new parliament with any party that supports the independent statehood of an indivisible Moldova within Europe. (These are code words for non-unification with Romania, reunification with Transnistria, and staying out of Russia's orbit). But the party's message also pays lip service to partnership with Russia, in deference to a sizeable portion of Moldova's and the party's own electorate.

(end of Part I of three)

"LIBERAL" PARTIES PROLIFERATE IN MOLDOVA'S ELECTORAL CAMPAIGN
(Moldova's Political Landscape on the Eve of General Elections: Part II of three)

by Vladimir Socor

Moldova's opposition parties are small and leader-centered. Most of the opposition parties compete against one another for the same segments of the electorate or for overlapping segments.

In these cases party labels are also often irrelevant or misleading. For a country that does not have anything resembling a bourgeoisie, Moldova has no fewer than four self-described liberal parties: three with the word "liberal" in their title and another one without that word, but with an application pending to join the Liberal International. The career backgrounds and current discourse of the four groups do not indicate any acquaintance with liberal doctrines. External attempts at unifying the Moldovan "Liberals" have failed.

The Liberal Party surged from an outer fringe to center stage in 2007, when 29-year-old Dorin Chirtoaca won, albeit with a minority of the votes in a low turnout, Chisinau's mayoral election against a Communist candidate. From that point onward, however, Chisinau City Hall became a byword for chaos, with the municipal council splintered among multiple warring factions, and the minority Liberals incapable of coalition-building. Mayor Chirtoaca nevertheless remains an electoral asset as a "fresh face" and perceived victim of scurrilous Communist polemics. He is, however, dominated by his uncle, the party leader Mihai Ghimpu, a confrontational personality, whose insistence on chairing the municipal council (alongside his nephew as mayor) has sparked constant strife with other non-communist parties.

The party draws its support mainly from "unionist" voters, i.e, those who favor privileged relations or, if possible, unification of Moldova with Romania. Many of those voters switched to the Liberal Party from the Christian-Democrats, after the latter had abandoned the "unionist" and anti-communist program. The Liberal leadership itself has its origins in the Romanian-minded movement of the 1990s and continues to practice an irredentist rhetoric. The party suggests postponing negotiations on Transnistria almost indefinitely, until Moldova "gains energy independence" and other distant goals (Infotag, March 2). Such suggestions reflect a traditional belief that abandonment of Transnistria could facilitate Moldova-Romania unification.

Thanks to Chirtoaca on its electoral slate, the party hopes to pass the 6 percent threshold into parliament, although Chirtoaca himself is not telling voters whether he would enter the parliament or stay on as mayor (Moldovan Public TV live debates, March 9). The Liberal Party rejects cooperation not only with Communists but also with their allies, with former nomenklatura members, and with "corrupt" politicians. These strictures target specific non- and anti-communist parties, seemingly ruling out coalitions with them in the new parliament. Meanwhile, Romanian President Traian Basescu periodically invites Chisinau's Liberal Party leaders to Romania and has also found other ways and means to demonstrate his support for this party.

A Liberal-Democrat Party, created in late 2007 in Moldova, competes with the Liberals for moderately pro-Romanian voters. Liberal-Democrats subscribe to the Romanian ethnic identity, and some party leaders are well connected in Romania, but the party does not propose anything like unification with Romania. The party's founding leader Vlad Filat, a wealthy businessman, was a government minister during the 1990s and has all along been accused of corruption in the press and parliament, but the accusations have never been proven in the courts. A wealthy business entity, Ascom, is also believed by many in Chisinau to support this party. Ascom has denied the suppositions, however (Timpul, March 13).

The Liberal-Democrat campaign is more professionally staffed and organized than the other opposition campaigns and has held several street rallies. The party's electoral slate includes some well-known lawyers and former diplomats. The party's number two leader, Alexandru Tanase, is currently the defense lawyer to former State Security Minister Valeriu Pasat. Widely seen as a pro-Moscow politician in Moldova, and suspected of involvement in a coup attempt in 2005, Pasat was framed by Moldovan prosecutors in that year on other charges, until Russia's then-president Vladimir Putin pressured Voronin to release Pasat to Russia. Some local observers speculate that a return of Pasat to Moldova is being prepared for the post-election period.

The National Liberal Party and the European Action Movement are small Romanian irredentist groups running on a joint list. Initially hoping to siphon off votes from the Christian-Democrat People's Party, they could ultimately affect the Liberals in the same way. Many candidates on all the self-declared Liberal lists are holders of Romanian citizenship.

Of all the self-declared liberal parties, the Alliance [for] Our Moldova is the least touched by modernity. Holding 13 seats in the outgoing parliament, Our Moldova has been described as a group of "angry old men" [pun on the British "angry young men" of 50 years ago] by local wit. Its power base consists mainly of mayors and councilors in rural districts, with incumbencies dating back many years. The party thus enjoys access to administrative resources in the countryside. The party is positioning itself as pro-European but also stressing good relations with Russia and reserving a role of "East-West bridge" for Moldova (Jurnal de Chisinau, March 6).

Our Moldova leader Serafim Urecheanu, a long-serving former mayor of Chisinau, was an unsuccessful presidential candidate in 2005, when he headed a larger party with support from Russian state television and Moscow advisers. Urecheanu's group attempted to contest the outcome of the 2005 elections even after the OSCE and Council of Europe observers had validated the results. This year again, a party billboard features "Urecheanu [for] President" and he sounds eager for another presidential run in the new parliament. Meanwhile, he has already accused the authorities of rigging these elections and pre-programming falsification of the numerical returns (Infotag, March 10).

Yet another hyphenated liberal party, the Social-Liberals, has now merged with several other small parties into the Democratic Party. Former president Petru Lucinschi's son Chiril, a wealthy businessman, has recently joined this party.

All the liberal-captioned parties support Moldova's "European Integration," vying with each other, as well as with the Communists, to show European credentials. This situation reflects a broad Moldovan consensus that has finally taken shape in the country on this issue. The liberal-titled parties (save Our Moldova) also would like Moldova to join NATO or work toward that goal, although any Moldovan government declaring this goal would only reinforce Russia's resolve to hold on to Transnistria.

COMMUNISTS CONSIDER POST-ELECTION ALLIANCES AHEAD OF MOLDOVA'S ELECTIONS
(Moldova's Political Landscape on the Eve of General Elections: Part III of three)

by Vladimir Socor

Moldova's Social-Democrat Party is being led by the tandem of former Prime Minister Dumitru Braghis (1999-2001) and young businessman-politician Eduard Musuc in these elections. The party targets both Moldovan and "Russian-speaking" voters. Accordingly, it promises to seek an association agreement with the EU, a strategic partnership with Russia and integration with the CIS at the same time. Braghis had cast his lot with Moscow in the 2004-2005 campaign alongside Serafim Urecheanu but broke with him afterward. A cautious and hesitant personality, Braghis is continuing a 1990s-style "two-vector" approach to relations with the West and Russia. The Musuc business family at one stage fell afoul of the authorities and Musuc senior moved to Transnistria, but Musuc junior is apparently reconciled with Voronin.

The Centrist Union is the outright pro-Russia party in these elections. Its new leader, Vasile Tarlev, served as prime minister for seven consecutive years under Voronin, was honorably discharged in 2008, and shocked the president's entourage by turning toward Moscow. Initially heading a list of "Friends of Russia in Moldova," Tarlev went on to take over the small Centrist Union and formed a joint list with three other Moscow-oriented groups: Ravnopravye, under its long-time leader Valery Klimenko (a local offshoot of the Congress of Russian Communities); the United Gagauzia movement, under the Gagauz Autonomy's elected leader (Bashkan) Mihail Formuzal; and the Republican People's Party, a splinter group from the formerly governing (1994-1998) Moldovan Agrarian-Democrat Party. The Justice Ministry twice invalidated Tarlev's takeover of the Centrist Union, but the courts overruled the ministry both times (Infotag, March 13).

Tarlev's group calls for strategic partnerships of Moldova with both the EU and Russia, closer relations with CIS countries, special status for the Russian language in Moldova, legalization of Russia's military presence by treaty, and negotiations on Transnistria directly with Moscow and the Tiraspol leaders. Tarlev advertises his relations with the One Russia party in Moscow and the Party of Regions in Ukraine, as well as overtures to the Romanian and Bulgarian governing parties. Tarlev happens to be an ethnic Bulgarian, but Bulgarian President Georgi Parvanov has just visited with President Vladimir Voronin in Moldova's Bulgarian-inhabited Taraclia district to show his support for the Moldovan president (Infotag, March 3; Basa-press, March 6; Moldpres, March 12, 13; NewsIn, March 15).

Moscow undoubtedly wants the parties of Tarlev and Braghis to absorb "Russian-speaking" and leftist votes from the Communist Party, undermining the latter's independence and nudging it into a coalition with Tarlev and/or Braghis in the new parliament. In that case Moscow could blackmail the Moldovan government at any time by threatening to withdraw Tarlev's party from the coalition. This scenario could work if the Communist Party does not find allies independent of Moscow in order to elect the new president and gain approval of the new government.

Such an ally could again be the right-wing Christian-Democrat People's Party (CDPP) if it passes the six percent threshold to parliament. The CDPP and its leader Iurie Rosca have the greatest longevity in Moldovan politics: Rosca has led the party since 1989 and the party (initially the Popular Front) has sat in parliament uninterruptedly since 1990. After many years of militant anti-communism and Romanian "unionism" (advocating for "Bessarabia's" unification with Romania), the party underwent a transformation during the parliamentary and presidential elections of March-April 2005. Following the presidential team's turnabout from a Russian to a European orientation, the CDPP entered into a parliamentary partnership with the Communist Party (see part I in this series, March 19).

The CDPP has since advanced from the role of Romanian irredentist party in "Bessarabia" to that of a European party in the Republic of Moldova and from leading anti-communist street protests to participating in major legislative and policy decisions, alongside a nominally communist majority and president. Consequently, the CDPP has lost a large part of its former electorate and even of its own parliamentary group. Authorities in Romania have ostracized the CDPP and encourage other Romanian-minded parties to supplant it.

Moldova's Romanian-minded and anti-communist voters have largely switched from the CDPP to nominally Liberal parties (see part II in this series, March 19). Meanwhile, the CDPP is targeting new groups of voters, mainly in young age groups and in those rural districts where the party still controls some towns and village councils. Young, unknown "fresh faces" predominate on the CDPP's electoral slate. The party's campaign seems to be spending far less money than other campaigns, including those of its direct rivals.

Eight parties are credited with chances to pass the six percent electoral threshold: the Communists, Liberal-Democrats, unhyphenated Liberals, Our Moldova, the Democrats, Social-Democrats, Centrist Union, and the CDPP. The Communists are expected to come in a distant first while the chances of the other seven parties are basically theoretical. A splintered parliament, devoid of a consistent majority, with unstable a government hostage to squabbling minority factions, could result in a "Ukrainization" of Moldova's politics.

Eurasia Daily Monitor. The Jamestown Foundation

March 19 , 2009—Volume 6, Issue 53

Friday, March 20, 2009—Volume 6, Issue 54